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I. INTRODUCTION
When April 20, 2011, arrived, several national news stations
recognized the date as the anniversary of the world’s most devastating
1
man-made disaster in history. Just one year earlier, every news station in
the country—and many European news stations—descended onto the
Louisiana coast for the purpose of discussing the explosion aboard BP’s
Deepwater Horizon’s oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico. The Deepwater
Horizon was less than fifty miles away from the coast line, but the
explosion shown brighter than fireworks in a midnight sky.
If any Louisiana citizen wanted to have their fifteen minutes of
fame, all they had to do was drive to Venice, Louisiana, and select any
one of the news reporters sitting or standing on the beach. Hotel rooms
were sold out. The number of men and women dressed in neon orange
† Prentice L. White is an Assistant Professor of Law at Southern University Law Center (Baton
Rouge, Louisiana), and is a former New Orleans prosecutor. He is currently a member of the
Louisiana Appellate Project, which is a state agency that handles criminal appeals for indigent
defendants in Louisiana and he is part of the CJA Panel of contract attorneys for the Middle and
Western Districts of Louisiana.
1. See Damien Cave, In Campaign, That Gulf Spill Covers Nation, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2010,
at A1; see also Alessandra Stanley, So Sayeth the Anchorman, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at C1.
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2

and draping the Louisiana coastline with booms resembled an AT&T
commercial showing how much coverage the AT&T mobile phones have
in the United States. The Gulf of Mexico waters had turned black from
3
the hundreds of thousands of gallons of crude spewing into the gulf.
Marine life could be seen trying to avoid the oil, but to no avail. Cable
news stations continuously monitored the live feed of the blow-out
4
valve, and reporters interviewed Plaquemine Parish President Billy
5
Nungesser more times than they interviewed President Barak Obama
during the 2008 Presidential Elections.
In fact, President Obama declared it to be the worst environmental
6
disaster in the United States history. President Obama later ordered
Interior Secretary Ken Salazar to conduct a comprehensive review of the
blowout valve and to report, within a thirty-day period, “what, if any,
additional precautions and technologies should be required to improve
the safety of oil and gas exploration and productions operations on the
7
outer continental shelf.” Generally speaking, it could have been much
8
worse had it not been for BP’s unusually deep pockets, and its ability to
9
fully compensate individuals injured from the oil spill. While BP was
able to mitigate some of the costs, this disaster will impact gulf residents
for years to come. This section will introduce these impacts by sharing
three unique stories. It will then discuss the social costs attributed to a
disaster of this magnitude. Finally, this section calls for action from
Louisiana’s legislature to create a deterrent to promote responsible
corporate practice and to protect residents from a known danger.

2. See Campbell Robertson, Efforts to Repel Gulf Spill Are Described as Chaotic, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2010, at A1.
3. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, as enacted, imposes strict liability for vessel spills upon the
“owner” and “operator” of the discharging vessel, but not the cargo owner. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702
(2008).
4. Shaila Dewan, In First Success, A Tube Captures Some Leaking Oil, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
2010, at A1.
5. Campbell Robertson & Elisabeth Rosenthal, Officials Voice Anger Touring Shores Fouled
by Slicks and Tar Balls, N. Y. TIMES, May 21, 2010.
6. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP
WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT 173 (2011) (quoting President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the Nation on
the BP Oil Spill (June 15, 2010), (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill)).
7. Jonathan C. Augustine, A National Model for Disaster Recovery: Growing Green Jobs in the
Age of Energy Efficiency, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 179, 193 (2012) (quoting Hornbeck Offshore
Servs. v. Salazar, 696 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630 (E. D. La. 2010)).
8. Jad Mouawad, et al., For BP, A Toll Likely to Extend Beyond the Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2010, at B1.
9. See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Deterring and Compensating Oil-Spill
Catastrophes: The Need for Strict and Two-Tier Liability, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1717 (2011).
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A. The Human Costs
A year after this horrible event, all that could be found on this once
vibrant beach area were three lonely people. Standing inches away from
the water stood a middle-aged man wearing a white T-shirt, a pair of blue
jeans and knee-high white rubber boots. This man, whom we shall refer
to as Jim, had been a Louisiana shrimper since he was thirteen. Jim had
10
later started his own fishing business after his father was diagnosed
with cancer. Jim’s family had been fishing and catching shrimp along the
11
Louisiana coasts for over three generations. Before, the BP Oil Spill,
Jim was able to accumulate a yearly salary of approximately $35,000,
12
but once the State of Louisiana prohibited him and other shrimpers
from fishing in the waters because of the oil spill, Jim’s income
plummeted to less than $700 a month for both May and June of 2010.
13
14
15
Jim joined the crew of clean-up workers BP hired to clean the
16
shoreline, but the income he received was barely enough to cover his
family’s basic living expenses—not including the mortgage on his
shrimp boat.
In July 2010, Jim defaulted on the boat mortgage. He later used
some of his savings to pay his monthly expenses and forfeited his eldest
son’s chance of going to college that fall. The money he received from
BP was less than what he expected. Considering that his business was
17
primarily in cash revenues, it was difficult for him to prove to the BP
10. See An Economy on Pause in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2010 (demonstrating
economic activities prevalent in the gulf prior to the spill).
11. See Katy Muldoon, Northwesterners Rush to Help Mitigate the Environment Disaster
Unfolding in the Gulf, THE OREGONIAN, May 22, 2010, http://www.oregonlive.com/environment/in
dex.ssf/2010/05/northwesterners_rush_to_help_m.html.
12. In Hurton Portland Cement Co. v. Detriot, 362 U. S. 440 (1960), the United States
Supreme Court upheld a local air pollution ordinance which regulated emissions from vessels on
navigable waters. The Supreme Court also noted that the local ordinance was designed to free from
pollution the very air that people breathe clearly and such legislation was within the realm of the
state’s police power.
13. John LeLand, Cleanup Hiring Feeds Frustration in Fishing Town, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2010, at A12.
14. Jad Mouawad & John Schwartz, Rising Cleanup Costs and Numerous Lawsuits Rattle BP’s
Investors, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/02liability.html?_r=0.
15. See NIEHS Activities Related to the Gulf Oil Spill: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010) (Statement of Aubrey Keith
Miller, M.D., MPH Senior Medical advisor, National Institute of Environmental Health Services,
National Institutes of Health, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services), [hereinafter Health
Effects] (stating that workers involved in cleanup have reported the highest levels of exposure and
the most acute symptoms, when compared to subjects exposed in different ways).
16. See John LeLand, supra note 13.
17. See Fay Pappas, Note, Gulf Coast Blowout: How the BP Oil Spill is Corroding
Communities And What Attorney’s & Policymakers Must Do to Stop It, 22 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 229 (2011) (classifying these cash-based businesses as Renewable Resource Communities
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claims representatives that he earned much more than what he could
prove on his tax returns and his other receipts. Kenneth Feinberg and his
18
team gave Jim a difficult time in assessing his claim for damages. Jim’s
shrimp boat was later repossessed. His wife got a waitressing job in
Jefferson Parish to help the family. Disappointing his children and
destroying his family’s fishing heritage made Jim suicidal and dependent
19
on various psychiatric medications. When the oil spill happened and
BP was experiencing severe problems with cutting off the blowout valve,
20
the fear among Jim and his fellow fishermen was staggering.
About twenty feet south of where Jim was sat Margaret, a co-owner
of a twenty-unit hotel in Venice, Louisiana, who was sitting on the sand,
letting the wind blow through her partially gray hair. Next to her was
Margaret’s husband, Robert, of thirty years. During the week of the
explosion, Robert and Margaret had been painting the rooms of the hotel
in anticipation of the sport fishermen and college students on spring
break who normally visit the gulf in the late spring. Instead of
vacationers, Margaret and Robert welcomed hundreds of national and
international journalists, as well as a host of reporters from cable news
networks to cover the BP Oil Spill. They even leased a room or two to
several BP executives who came to Louisiana to establish BP’s presence
for public relations purposes.
What they expected to be a mediocre weekend actually tripled their
accounts receivable. In fact, they received more during the first three
weeks of the oil spill than the first six months of last year’s profit
margin. Suddenly, the oil started to wash ashore in May 2010, and began
invading Louisiana’s beaches and precious marshlands. The reporters
were fearful of what diseases or illnesses they might contract being so
close to the contaminated waters. BP’s claims adjusters were checking
out and Margaret’s regular patrons were canceling their vacation plans to
Louisiana. The short-term profit did not make up for the huge losses that
because these Gulf Coast communities have very little occupational variety outside of commercial
fishing other than the businesses directly supported by the fishing industry; such as processing plants
and local restaurants).
18. See Terry Carter, Master of Disasters: Is Ken Feinberg Changing the Course of Mass Tort
Resolution?, ABA JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 2011 (stating that “[t]he BP oil spill looks to be Feinberg’s most
problematic challenge to date. It is difficult to assay the future of the Gulf’s health, and thus the
livelihoods of tens or hundreds of thousands, and resulting ripple effects elsewhere”—especially the
cash-only economy that predominates the small-scale commercial fishing industry).
19. See Health Effects, supra note 15(arguing that clean-up workers reported higher levels of
generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and depressive symptoms).
20. See Pappas, supra note 17, at 245 (discussing Dr. Arwen Podesta, a psychiatrist at Tulane
University in New Orleans, who described the behavior of these Louisiana fisherman following
Hurricane Katrina and the BP Oil Spill as “teetering on the edge of wellness” and “decompensating
into severe depression and resurgence of PTSD” from Katrina).

2013]

We Want Our Lives Back Too

105

came later. Pretty soon, Margaret and Robert had exhausted their
unprecedented profits. Desperate for money to take care of his wife,
21
22
Robert joined one of the cleanup crews, hoping to accelerate the
progress of getting the beaches clean and welcoming vacationers back to
Louisiana, but the cleanup crews faced their own challenges.
Many residents described the smell of crude oil in the Gulf as
23
overpowering. Some feared that the parish’s drinking water would also
be compromised. In fact, Robert had been working for the cleanup crew
24
for only three weeks, before he developed a respiratory infection in his
lungs from inhaling the fumes from the crude oil washing ashore the
Louisiana beaches. Soon, Margaret found herself abandoning their hotel
to care for her ailing husband. Watching the man who once seemed
unstoppable turn into someone who could not walk from the kitchen to
the bedroom without becoming exhausted was heartbreaking. The couple
invested so much in their hotel that if something happened to her
husband, Margaret would be bankrupt in less than five years. Margaret
25
regularly came to the beach to pray because she feared her entire
financial life was coming to an end and she wanted to remember why she
and her husband chose Venice, Louisiana, to start their business—the
beautiful sunsets and the Gulf of Mexico’s hypnotizing waters.
Walking past Margaret was a young woman in her twenties who
was sobbing uncontrollably. She was wearing a faded men’s college
sweatshirt and a pair of pajama pants. Standing in the spring sunshine,
anyone could see the dazzling diamond engagement ring on her left
hand. This young woman’s sadness did not stem from a crumbling
business or an irreparable career, instead, Jenny was mourning the loss of
her fiancé who was killed aboard the Deepwater Horizon in April 2010.
They were scheduled to be married two months after the explosion. But
21. See Muldoon, supra note 11.
22. See Press Release, Gulf Coast Senators Introduce Resolution Urging BP to Use Local
Products and Services in Oil Spill Activities, Government Press Releases (July 15, 2010)
[hereinafter GULF COAST SENATORS] (stating that BP would be wise to use the fishermen, hoteliers,
restaurateurs, and other local residents to assist in the taking the edge off the economic disaster this
spill has caused to this region).
23. See Heath Effects, supra note 15 (quoting Dr. Miller’s testimony wherein he stated that
“the oil nearest the source of a spill contains higher levels of some volatile and more toxics
components, such as benzene, toluene, and xylene”).
24. Id.
25. See Pappas, supra note 17, at 244 (indicating that Dr. Irwin Redlender, the President and
Center Director of the Children’s Health Fund, conducted a survey of 1200 Gulf Coast residents in
Louisiana and Mississippi, and discovered that there existed “a persistent and overwhelming level of
anxiety among families living near the coast that is driven by both medical symptoms in their
children as well as substantial level of psychological stress”) (citing Debbie Elliot & Marisa
Penaloza, BP Spill Psychological Scars Similar to Exxon Valdez, Nat. Pub. Radio (Dec. 1, 2010)
http://www.npr.org/2010/12/01/131694848/bp-spill-psychological-scars-similar-to-exxon-valdez).
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now, all Jenny has to remember her fiancé are pictures, a few of his
college sport shirts, and a host of memories she wakes up to every
morning.
B. The Social Costs
Jim, Margaret, and Jenny represent three categories of gulf coast
residents whose lives were forever changed by the BP Oil Spill. Five
months after the spill, BP capped its massive gusher at the bottom of the
Gulf, but the Louisiana coastline was still saturated from the hundreds of
thousands of gallons of crude oil from the oil rig that was positioned
26
approximately forty-one miles off the Louisiana coast. Marine animals
were either contaminated or killed by the brown-colored sludge that
ascended 5,000 miles from the floor of the Gulf of Mexico. Men and
women have seen their life savings evaporate. Students were forced to
withdraw from college and return home to help their parents and
grandparents pay their mortgages/rent and utilities. Some have even
taken their lives due to the enormous amount of stress and anxiety from
this horrible accident. The stories of these three people were not included
for dramatic effect, but were instead included in an effort to give a full
27
appreciation of the human cost of the BP oil spill, so the reader can
fully appreciate of the realities of what the BP Oil Spill had done to the
28
lives of Louisiana’s residents, its wildlife, and its coastline.
Now, in the aftermath of the BP Oil Spill, it is incumbent on the
State of Louisiana to protect its citizenry by incorporating policies to
ensure that its residents will not have to experience such a hardship and
29
will have the financial resources to recover from future disasters.
Simply because the oil is not floating on the surface of the water does not
30
mean that the threat is over or that the harm has been minimized. Over

26. See Jay Reeves, America Moves On From Spill: Coast Feels Abandoned, HUFFINGTON
POST, Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/09/america-moves-on-fromspi_n_756928.html.
27. Id. (declaring that there is nothing more unsettling about the worst man-made disaster in U.
S. history than the nation’s short attention span and their desire to hear something different or to talk
about the next big thing).
28. See Krissah Thompson, As Gulf Cleanup Continues, BP Will Also Struggle to Clean Up Its
Brand, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR2010081803063.html?hpid=topnews (writing that David Kotok,
chief investment officer for Cumberland Advisors, says that BP will pay out at least $50 billion in
fines, lawsuits, and settlements related to the oil spill, but has little to no idea how BP would initiate
a brand comeback after this type of disaster).
29. Melinda Deslatte, Lawmakers Rant Futilely about Oil Spill, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 20,
2010,
http://www.pddnet.com/news/2010/06/analysis-lawmakers-rant-futilely-about-oil-spill?qtmost_popular=0.
30. See Reeves, supra note 26.
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the last two years since the BP Oil Spill, many Louisiana residents have
entered into a heightened panic during the hurricane seasons because of
the possibility that oil sediments from the spill could be moved onto
31
Louisiana’s wetlands and beaches.
For this reason, policies that promote a culture of corporate
responsibility would be instrumental in guarding the public against high
levels of mental stress, unemployment, and loss of life that spread
profusely in southeast Louisiana in the years following the BP explosion.
Louisiana lawmakers must promote policies and legislation that will not
only provide additional avenues of recovery for those injured by
corporate carelessness, but also broadcast to other companies (both
32
present and future) that corporate responsibility will forever be at the
forefront of all commercial activity within Louisiana’s borders.
Whatever policies, statutes, regulations, or bills are introduced to shield
Louisiana from any future threats, it must include a human rights due
diligence component. After all, what happened on April 20, 2010, was
33
definitely a human rights violation because BP overlooked,
disregarded, and/or neglected to consider the impact its business
decisions would have on the economy, the wildlife, the coastline, and the
mental stability of Gulf Coast residents—especially the residents of the
34
State of Louisiana. Many of the Gulf Coast communities have their
livelihoods inextricably linked to the environment. Communities in
southwest Louisiana face particularly serious challenges with
overcoming the effects of the oil spill due to the persistent language and
cultural barriers between the Cajun descendants and Vietnamese refugees
35
who have settled in the area.

31. See Amy Wold, Isaac’s Impact on BP Oil Unknown, THE ADVOCATE, Sept.1, 2012,
http://theadvocate.com/home/3777018-125/isaacs-impact-on-bp-oil (discussing the apprehension
many state administrators felt regarding the possibility of Hurricane Isaac stirring up the more than
one million barrels of oil buried in the sediments of the Gulf of Mexico with its 100 mile-per-hour
winds).
32. See Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971), (indicating that the
storage of dangerous and highly poisonous gas by the defendant corporation was an activity which,
even when conducted with the greatest of care and prudence, could still cause damage to others in
the neighborhood based upon the possible consequence that gas could escape and cause harm).
33. See Thompson, supra note 28 (David Kotok, the chief investment officer for Cumberland
advisors notes that there is a “human and psychological factor that is impossible to measure” and
“‘BP’ becomes the identification of the perpetrator of the trauma and it’s a long-term relationship
damaged”).
34. David Segal, Should BP’s Money Go Where the Oil Didn’t?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at
BU1.
35. See Mireya Navarro, Spill Takes Toll on Gulf Workers’ Psyches, N. Y. TIMES, June 16,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/17human.html?scp=3&sq=impact%20of%C20BP%C
20oil%C20spill%C20on%20fisherman&st=cse.
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C. The Call for Change
This Article attempts to introduce an idea for Louisiana legislators
to consider as a proactive measure in protecting Louisiana citizens from
the negligent and reckless behavior of corporations that have decided to
engage in commercial activity within the state. This Article suggests that
36
Louisiana should expand the scope of its absolute liability statute
(Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code) to address some of the
problems our citizens have experienced while enduring the BP Oil Spill
debacle in the spring of 2010.
The theory underlying the doctrine of absolute liability is that while
abnormally dangerous activities may not be illegal and may even
have beneficial results, these activities should pay their own way.
Thus, even though an individual [or a juridical person] who is engaged in an activity such as blasting or flying an airplane cannot
with utmost care and skill prevent some accidents, he should[,] nevertheless, be responsible to those that are injured as a result of his
activities. Absolute liability then, is the price to be paid for the priv37
ilege of engaging in abnormally hazardous activities.

This Article will address the need for the state legislature to make a
drastic response by reviewing cases around the country where
corporations have been held civilly liable for the consequences that
resulted from their negligent acts. This Article will also discuss why
expanding the state’s absolute liability statute is appropriate—both
socially and fiscally.
II. HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILIGENCE—WHY IS IT NOT FIRST AND
FOREMOST IN THE CORPORATE MAKEUP OF OUR SOCIETY?
38

Louisiana is no stranger to natural and man-made disasters. In
addition to battling a number of natural disasters such as Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, Louisiana citizens have had to combat man-made
36. See W. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 505-16, 974-75
(5th ed. 1984) (defining absolute liability based on the presumption that certain activity is extrahazardous; therefore, the participant in this hazardous activity is saddled with the burden of being
liable for any damage he causes).
37. Major Fred K. Morrison, Absolute Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 MIL. L.
REV. 53, 55 (1973).
38. See generally J. Steven Picou, When The Solution Becomes the Problem: The Impacts of
Adversarial Litigation on Survivors of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 68, 70-71
(2009) (distinguishing technological disasters from natural disasters through association with
anthropogenic causes such as careless, irresponsible, or reckless behavior. “Most often such
behavior results from a technological system failure or the lack of organizational vigilance in the
operation and management of toxic production, transportation, and containment systems.
Technological disasters occur when systems thought to be under human control fail, resulting in the
toxic contamination of the biophysical environment”).
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environmental disasters caused by businesses. Because Louisiana
citizens have historically been responsible for a disproportionate amount
of cost as a result of these man-made disasters, Louisiana law should
incorporate a mechanism to protect the financial interests of its state’s
citizens. The following cases illustrate how corporations have caused
disastrous consequences from their abuse of power in Louisiana.
39
In Davis v. Insurance Co. of North America, a temporary worker
for Independent Tank Cleaning Services (Independent) was severely
injured while cleaning a tanker that was delivered to Independent by
40
Schneider National Bulk Carriers, Inc., (Schneider). Both Independent
and Schneider claimed no accountability for the plaintiff’s injuries.
Specifically, both Independent and Schneider (defendants) alleged that
Davis (plaintiff) caused his own injuries (victim’s fault) by using a leaf
blower to extract the flammable fumes from the tanker. On the other
hand, Davis argued that Schneider was at fault for failing to take
41
reasonable measures to protect Davis from the risk of harm. Davis’s
workers’ compensation carrier intervened in the lawsuit, seeking
reimbursement from one, or both, of the defendants.
Ultimately, the district court released both defendants from liability
by granting their summary judgment motions. The plaintiff attempted to
hold Schneider accountable under Louisiana’s absolute liability statute,
42
which is found in Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code. The plaintiff
43
alleged that because Schneider engaged in ultra-hazardous activity, it
44
should be held accountable for any, and all, injuries he sustained. The
First Circuit disagreed, concluding that the activity the plaintiff was
involved in at the time of his injuries was not ultrahazardous—even
though the storage of toxic gases was listed as an example of
45
ultrahazardous activity. The Fifth Circuit concluded that neither
defendant engaged in ultrahazardous activity because Independent
cleaned the tanks in question on a routine basis, and a professional
cleaning company had cleaned the tanks prior to Independent.

39. See Davis v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 94-0698 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/3/95); 652 So. 2d 531.
40. Id. at 534.
41. Id. at 535.
42. Under the Louisiana statute establishing limitations on use of property, strict liability is
limited to ultra-hazardous activities of pile driving and blasting with explosives, and otherwise
liability requires a showing of knowledge and negligence. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (2012);
see also TS & C Invs., LLC v. BEUSA Energy, Inc., 637 F. Supp. 2d 370, 380 (W. D. La. 2009).
43. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 498 (La. 1982).
44. See Davis, 652 So. 2d at 535.
45. For an activity to be labeled “ultra-hazardous” it must be one that can cause injury to
others, even when conducted with the greatest prudence and care. See Updike v. Browning-Ferris,
Inc., 808 F. Supp. 538 (W.D. La. 1992).
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In TS & C Investments v. BEUSA Energy, Inc., TS & C
Investments (plaintiffs), representing themselves and the other residents
in Iberville Parish, filed a punitive class action lawsuit complaint against
BEUSA Energy (defendant), alleging damages for loss of business, loss
of economic opportunity, nuisance, and mental anguish resulting from an
47
oil well blowout that closed Interstate 10. The plaintiffs’ cause of
action against the defendant rested totally on economic damages and did
not involve any physical or property damages, which are necessary under
48
Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code. Using the Erie doctrine
regarding a plaintiff’s claim for purely economic damages under Article
667, the federal district court noted that Louisiana jurisprudence
previously concluded that a party may not recover for economic loss not
49
associated with physical damage or proprietary damage.
Examples of corporate mismanagement and abuse are endless. With
more and more corporations trying to obtain optimum wealth and
monopoly status against their competitors, it is not surprising that the
general public is regularly overlooked. The argument was that the United
States, with its enormous amount of activity, armed forces, space
exploration, Atomic Energy Commission, crime-fighting activities, and
endless construction projects, should be immune from absolute
50
liability. However, to shield the federal government from this risk
would emasculate the purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act, and force
51
the public to bear this horrendous burden.
The overwhelming interest of most domestic corporations is to
increase their profit margin and to decrease their tax liability. Simply
canvassing recent national newspapers and cable news stations can tell
you how most Americans feel about today’s corporate climate. From the
Wall Street debacle to the near congressional deadlock that took place
during the debt-ceiling debate in the summer of 2011; the public’s
52
53
distrust of government is ever-growing and could jeopardize this

46. See TS & C Invs., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
47. Id.
48. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that a federal court
interpreting a state law must look to the final decisions of that state’s highest court to determine the
merits of the plaintiff’s complaint); see also TS & C Invs., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
49. See TS & C Invs., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
50. The discretionary function exception was the basis for denying liability to the federal
government for the Texas City Disaster in the United States case of Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 57-9 (1953).
51. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15.
52. See Thompson, supra note 28.
53. See Matthew Cardinale, Gulf Spill Galvanizes Activist Community, INTER PRESS SERVICE
(June 30, 2010), http://ipsnorthamerica.net/news.php?idnews=3167.
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nation’s economic recovery unless corporations make basic human rights
54
a priority.
If these corporate citizens fail to prioritize human rights in their
55
agenda, then perhaps corporate criminal liability may become an option
56
for deterrence. Some scholars caution against an overuse of the penal
code to punish corporate offenders because prosecuting corporations can
cause: (1) employees to lose a source of income; (2) shareholders and
consumers to carry the burden of huge fines in the form of lower
dividends and higher prices; (3) basic business practices to be confused
with criminal activity; and (4) individual actors (corporate CEOs) to be
57
shielded from personal responsibility or walking away from criminal
58
prosecution under the cloak of corporate impunity.
David Kotok, the Chief Investment Officer for Cumberland
Advisors, stated that BP, following the April 2010 disaster, would have
to do something more than just fix the damage from the oil spill. BP
would have to do something positive, something huge, and it would have
to do it for a rather long time before the public would be willing to
59
forgive. Therefore, inserting a human rights due diligence component
into Louisiana’s corporate statutes and business culture is essential.
Professor John Ruggie, a business professor at the Harvard
University Kennedy School of Business and the United Nations Special
Representative on Business and Human Rights (SRSG), coined the term
human rights due diligence to describe what companies should do to
meet their responsibility, to respect human rights, and to demonstrate to
60
others that they do.

54. Id.
55. See Faisal A. Shuja, Federal Criminal Issues Presented by the British Petroleum Oil Spill,
9 LOY. MAR. L. J. 115 (2011) (stating that the Department of Justice will bring criminal charges
against BP for endangering the marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico).
56. See Don Stuart, Punishing Corporate Criminals With Restraint, 6 CRIM. L. F. 219, 240
(1995) (indicating that “most state corporate criminal liability is based on legislative enactment of
the relevant provisions of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code . . . [which] provides for
corporate liability respecting three forms of wrongful conduct: (1) regulatory offenses; (2) failures to
perform specific duties imposed by law, and (3) penal law violations”).
57. See EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME (1949).
58. See Morrison, supra note 37, at 60 (stating that engaging in an abnormally dangerous
activity is not actually wrongful until an injury results, which ultimately makes the activity
sufficiently wrongful and the actor understandably liable).
59. See Thompson, supra note 28.
60. See John Sherman, Whose Risk Is It? Viewing Corporate Catastrophe Through a Human
Rights Lens, 6 No. 4 In-HOUSE PERSP. 9 (2010) (citing John Ruggie, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (9 April 2010), available at
www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf [hereinafter Protect, Respect and Remedy]).
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BP’s history of committing felony violations in its safety
procedures, storage, extraction, and manufacturing of its oil products
provides sufficient evidence for the Department of Justice to issue a
63
64
criminal indictment for the Gulf Oil Spill. The purpose of imposing
criminal penalties against corporate giants like BP is to protect the
65
environment (including wildlife) and to insure the purity of the nation’s
66
waters. Congress specifically passed the Clean Water Act, the
67
68
Endangered Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the
69
Oil Pollution Act to impose criminal liability and protect the
70
environment.
III. LOUISIANA’S PROPOSED RESPONSE TO THE OIL SPILL
Regardless of whether corporations decide to change their agenda or
not, the state of Louisiana must set in motion progressive and bold ideas
to protect its citizenry and close off any potential opportunities for other
commercial juggernauts, like BP, to come upon its shores and
contaminate its wildlife and its unique way of life. With this in mind, this
Author proposes that our state legislators consider amending Article 667
of the Louisiana Civil Code to include oil drilling as a third category of
ultrahazardous activity that could expose a landowner, lessee, lessor, or
corporation to damages. In fact, deepwater drilling provides a timely case
study of how to structure liability for an economic activity that can cause
catastrophic loss. The activity of deepwater drilling can exceed the
injurer’s financial resources, and without imposing some form of
liability, the tort liability system can be diluted from creating incentives
71
72
for safety and it may limit compensation for the injured.
61. See Joe Nocera, BP Ignored the Omens of Disasters, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at B1.
62. See John Collins Rudolf, BP Station Owners Face Long Road to Recovery, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2010, at B1.
63. See generally United States v. BP Products N. Am., Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 655, 670 (S. D.
Tex. 2009).
64. See Shuja, supra note 55, at 117-18.
65. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1361.
69. COMM. ON ENV’T AND PUB. WORKS, S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723 (declaring that the two-fold mission of the OPA was to: (1) coordinate
existing state and federal law addressing the problem of oil pollution; and (2) establish a
comprehensive liability scheme that “internalized” the costs of clean-up and compensation within
the oil industry).
70. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761.
71. See Marva Jo Wyatt, Financing the Clean-Up: Cargo Owner Liability for Vessel Spills, 7
U.S.F. MAR. L. J. 353 (1995) (stating that without a threat of liability, there exist no real incentives
for the oil industry to prevent spills).
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Louisiana Civil Code Article 667 provides the following:
Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases,
still he cannot make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of
any damage to him. However, if the work he makes on his estate
deprives his neighbor of enjoyment or causes damage to him, he is
answerable for damages only upon a showing that he knew or, in
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that his works
would cause damage, that the damage could have been prevented by
the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such
reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court
73
from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case. Nonetheless, the proprietor is answerable for damages without regard to his knowledge or his exercise of reasonable
care, if the damage is caused by an ultrahazardous activity. An ultrahazardous activity as used in this Article is strictly limited to pile
74
driving or blasting with explosives.

It is obvious that the legislature intended to hold the tortious
neighbor accountable for his fellow neighbor’s injuries under either
75
negligence (i.e. fault) or under absolute liability, which does not
require a finding of fault. It is unfortunate that the language in Article
667 limits the description of absolute liability to pile driving and blasting
76
with explosives. Oil drilling and oil exploration in general are a
combination of qualifying activities. This Author suggests that this fact
77
presents a unique opportunity for the Louisiana legislature to consider
amending the list of ultrahazardous activities.
Every theory of tort liability from intentional torts to strict liability
can be found within Article 2315 or the several articles drafted by the
legislature derived from Article 2315. It is the fountainhead of
Louisiana’s tort law. However, the legislature nestled the principles of
products liability and absolute liability under Title 9 section 2800 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes and Civil Code Article 667, respectively.
This Author’s proposal to amend Article 667 to address the issues that
arose during the BP Oil Spill came as a result of reviewing the language
72. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1719.
73. Kenneth Culp Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REV. 751, 791
(1956) (stating that res ipsa loquitur presumes that, without negligence, there would not have been
an injury).
74. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667 (2012).
75. See Wyatt, supra note 71, at 371 (stating that “the goal of absolute liability is compensation
as opposed to punishment”).
76. Id.
77. See Raphael Brothers v. Cerophyl Laboratories, 30 So. 2d 116 (La. 1947).
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in Article 667 and seeing the similarities between pile driving and
blasting with explosives, the two activities that qualify as ultrahazardous,
and oil drilling.
Several civilian scholars have noted that if ultrahazardous activities
were to include any land-related activity, the floodgates of litigation
would be opened, and every conceivable incident that resulted in a
landowner being harmed from his neighbor’s use of his property would
78
79
be an absolute liability situation.
80
For example, in Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Company, the family
of a deceased 18-year-old employee of a Baton Rouge contracting
81
company filed a wrongful death action against the decedent’s employer
and the electrical utility company that serviced the power line that
82
electrocuted the decedent.
The decedent’s employer settled with the
family prior to trial, and the jury found the remaining defendant (the
electric company) liable for $3 million. The jury also found the
decedent’s employer liable for a percentage of the harm caused in failing
to properly supervise the decedent prior to the accident. The appellate
court affirmed the finding of liability for the contracting company, but it
83
reversed the finding of liability for the electrical utility company. The
appellate court opined that the decedent’s use of a highly dangerous
method of placing grooves in the newly poured concrete street surface
was indicative of his negligence. The decedent’s actions constituted
contributory negligence and barred any recovery he could claim from the
utility company.
Being that Kent was decided before the 1996 amendments to Article
667 of the Civil Code, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the
84
argument that transmitting electricity for public consumption was
78. In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation, 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that a fireman was entitled to receive damages from the defendant corporation
after he suffered personal injuries from the inhalation of gasses that escaped from the defendant
chemical corporation. The Langlois court noted that the defendant corporation’s ultrahazardous
activities were the storage and transportation of a gas known as antimony pentachloride, which
emanated from a ruptured pipe on the defendant corporation’s premises.
79. See John C. Anjier, Butler v. Baber: Absolute Liability for Environmental Hazards, 49 LA.
L. REV. 1139 (1989) (offering a host of scenarios in which a land-owner can hold another landowner
accountable for harm caused by the other neighbor’s use of his property. “For example, a business
would be liable for any of its discharges into the water or air that caused harm, even if they were
reasonable under the circumstances and the business had obtained the required necessary permits
and authority”).
80. See Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 493 (La. 1982).
81. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.5 (2012).
82. Kent, 418 So. 2d at 563.
83. Id. at 570.
84. Electrical companies are not insurers of the safety of the public. See 29 C.J.S. Electricity §
38 (2013); see also Bosley v. Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 255 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1969).
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another category of absolute liability, similar to pile-driving, storage of
toxic gas, crop dusting, and blasting with explosives. The court began its
analysis with the well-established understanding that absolute liability is
not contingent on an actor’s substandard conduct. The Louisiana
Supreme Court made it clear that absolute liability does require evidence
of damages and causation.
Accordingly, the court ruled that liability would not attach to the
utility company because causation could not be established without a
showing that the decedent’s electrocution resulted from the utility
company’s activity of transmitting electricity through the high-powered
lines directly above the area where he was working. In addition, the court
could not find any precedence for imposing absolute liability on
85
transmitting electricity for public consumption.
Unlike Kent, the damage to Louisiana coastline citizens from the oil
spill requires the state to take bold and, perhaps, unorthodox measures to
protect residents and to ensure that Louisiana will do whatever is
necessary to protect human rights.
When this Author initially proposed amending Article 667 to
include oil drilling activities as a third example of ultra-hazardous
activities, there were some who sprinkled a healthy dose of skepticism
over the idea, calling the proposed amendments unnecessary since
Louisiana’s tort statutes were more than sufficient to address any
potential harm endured. Some critics even concluded that a property
article, like Article 667, would not add much assistance to those persons
harmed by the BP Oil Spill. They further stated that jurists were capable
of finding an appropriate remedy for those Louisiana citizens injured by
BP’s recklessness.
While Louisiana jurists do not lack skill or analytical talent, there is
86
a continuing threat that our courts will not consider Louisiana property
laws as addressing this type of issue. Instead, the courts will begin to
settle upon alternative theories of liability to address the plaintiff’s
87
injuries. It is necessary that the legislature intervene to provide
consistency in the law as well as aggressively recompense the plaintiff
for his harm for two key reasons—(1) the grand nature of the 2010 BP
Oil Spill and (2) the similarities between oil drilling and the two
specified examples of ultra-hazardous activities.
85. See Annotation, Applicability of Rule of Strict Liability to Injury from Electrical Current
Escaping from Powerline, 82 A.L.R. 3d 218 (1978).
86. See Wex S. Malone, Work of Appellate Courts-1969-1970: Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 231, 239
(1971) (stating that Art. 667, being a rule of property, not of tort, did not lend itself well to the
purpose of deciding which harms and annoyances should be accepted by society without recourse,
and which enterprises should be made to bear liability for their activities without qualification).
87. See Morrison, supra note 37, at 66.
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First, the 2010 BP Oil Spill was one of the most costly man-made
disasters in this country’s history. Thousands of miles of Louisiana
88
beaches were damaged by crude oil that washed onto its borders.
Hundreds of families lost their businesses. Stories of suicides and
suicidal ideations became the soup of the day. National and international
news stations were positioned all over the Plaquemine Parish, Louisiana
and kept a running tab on the amount of oil spewing from the damaged
89
blowout valve. BP pointed the finger of accountability at TransOcean
90
and TransOcean turned the focus to Haliburton. Haliburton and
Transocean then retaliated, stating that BP was solely responsible for the
explosion, which caused the death of eleven oil workers and the spillage
91
of over four million gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico. While
the BP Oil Spill deserves the unyielding attention of our state legislature,
to suggest that Louisiana’s current tort law is sufficient to address the
wrongs committed by this multi-billion dollar foreign company is
appalling and contemptible.
92
Secondly, absolute liability is a reasonable avenue of recovery for
any injured plaintiff who has been temporarily or permanently harmed by
the drilling operations of an oil company. The oil-drilling process is very
similar to pile-driving and blasting with explosives. The Louisiana
93
legislature must make its response swift, direct, and unavoidable.
Further, absolute liability does not hinge upon the negligent behavior of
94
the actor, but instead hinges on the fact that harm was caused.
88. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1744 (stating that the oil spill has led to a
substantial drop in tourism; even though BP had dedicated a substantial amount of its financial
resources towards rejuvenating Gulf Coast vacationers to return to Gulf Coast beaches, the fact
remains that consumer confidence is not compensable under current law).
89. See Campbell Robertson & Matthew L. Wald, The Tangled Question of Liability, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A20; John M. Broder, Ruling Favors Owner of Rig In Gulf Spill, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2012, at B4.
90. See Barry Meir & Clifford Krauss, Spill Inquiry Again Puts Haliburton Into Spotlight, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2010, at A20.
91. Id.
92. See Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905 (1973) (stating
that [a]ny activity, which causes damage to a neighbor’s property, obliges the actor to repair the
damage, even though his actions are prudent by usual standards. It is not the manner in which the
activity is carried on which is significant; it is the fact that the activity causes damage to a neighbor,
which is relevant).
93. See Pappas, supra note 17, at 251 (asserting that some states have encouraged attorneys to
participate (pro bono) in community-driven mediation programs to between the economicallyinjured residents and the harm-causing companies so that litigation would be thwarted and the
attorneys could receive annual pro bono hours as compensation).
94. “The doctrine of sic utere tuum ut alienum non laedas requires an owner to use his property
in such a manner as not to injure another.” Mossy Motors, Inc., v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New
Orleans, 98-0495 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/12/99); 753 So. 2d 269, 274 (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 667
(2012) and Haworth v. L’Hoste, 95-0714 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/30/95); 664 So. 2d 1335, writ denied
670 So. 2d 1235).
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Considering the amount of mental, physical, and economic harm
experienced by Louisiana citizens who have lost loved ones or have lost
their family’s businesses, it is appropriate for oil drilling giants, like BP,
95
to pay for all harm resulting from their negligent conduct. This Article
also addresses those oil-drilling corporations that have insufficient
resources to cover the most extreme outcomes. Otherwise, the federal or
state governments would become the general insurers for those firms
96
least capable of handling these low-probability, high-loss situations.
Theoretically, legislative bodies are the preferred institution to initiate reform of any area of the law…[m]oreover, legislatures can accomplish comprehensive reform through a single statutory enactment; unfortunately, modern legislatures have developed powerful
inertial forces that render them impotent to make comprehensive
97
changes in the law that will adversely affect vested interests.

This Author, along with the countless other Louisiana residents who
have been intimately or remotely affected by the spill, cannot be satisfied
with a simple injunction or any kind of recovery that emanates from the
current language found in Article 667 of the Louisiana Civil Code. An
amendment to this article is necessary and imperative. Since absolute
liability is a hybrid of both strict liability and negligence concepts, it is
unreasonable for any civilian scholar or legislator to oppose the idea of
98
encapsulating oil drilling as a third category of ultra-hazardous
99
activity in Louisiana. Ultra-hazardous activity has been uniquely
classified as those activities that are capable of causing injuries to others,
100
even when conducted with the greatest degree of prudence and care.
The other factors engraved into our understanding of ultra-hazardous
95. See GULF COAST SENATORS, supra note 22, (declaring resources from the fishing, tourism,
shipping, and energy exploration industries account for over $200 billion in economic activity each
year).
96. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1721.
97. See Richard Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 917 (1985); see
also Richard J. Pierce & Sidney A. Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX.
L. REV. 1175, 1196-99 (1981).
98. This Author recognizes that several courts across the country have rejected, over the years,
the idea of expanding absolute liability to certain activities notwithstanding the dangers. See, e.g.,
Bosley v. Cent. Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 255 A.2d 671 (Vt. 1969) (declaring that Supreme Court of
Vermont would not invoke the doctrine of absolute liability against a public service corporation due
to electrical burns a young boy received when he came in contact with that corporation’s electrical
wires).
99. See Street v. Equitable Petroleum Corp., 532 So. 2d 887 (La. 1988) (applying the Butler v.
Baber principle, stating that “667/2315” liability may be imposed without proof that an activity
(storage/spillage of oil) is ultra-hazardous).
100. See Ainsworth v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 829 F.2d 548, 549 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485
U.S. 1034 (1988); see also Hawkins v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 766 F. 2d 904, 907 (5th Cir.
1985).
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activity are the extremely lucrative nature and catastrophic effects that
101
can result from the activity. For BP, the economic incentives to drill
resulted in risky behavior that devastated the Louisiana coastline.
In a case dealing with ultra-hazardous activity, Mossy Motors, Inc.
102
v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans,
a New Orleans car
dealership filed suit against the Sewerage & Water Board of New
Orleans (SWB), its contractor, and its engineer for structural damage and
103
business-related interruption.
The dealership sustained structural
damage as a result of the demolition and replacement of an underground
104
concrete structure that was adjacent to the dealership.
SWB and its
105
agents conducted deep well pumping or dewatering at this particular
106
site, which not only caused the water table in the area to be lowered,
but also caused settlement or subsidence of the ground that compromised
107
the structural integrity of the dealership’s buildings. To add validity to
its argument, the dealership presented evidence reflecting that SWB
could have used less dangerous measures to remove the contaminated
108
soil near the dealership. However, the method of removal selected by
109
the defendant agency was imprudent, impracticable, and dilatory.
The similarities between the dewatering process in Mossy Motors
and the oil drilling operations performed by BP at its Deepwater Horizon
110
site in April 2010 are clear: SWB was negligent (i.e. strictly liable),
or at fault, because it selected a process of sediment removal that it
knew, or should have known, would damage nearby structures. Prior to
its amendment in 1996, Article 667 would have held SWB accountable
111
for the damage caused by the dewatering process, and the degree of

101. See Ainsworth, 829 F.2d at 549-50.
102. See Mossy Motors, Inc., v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 98-0495 (La. App. 4
Cir. 5/12/99); 753 So. 2d 269.
103. Id. at 273.
104. Id.
105. Dewatering is a process involving the pumping out of underground water from a
construction site. See id. at 274.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Prentice L. White, When Theory Met Practice: Teaching Tort Law from a Practical
Perspective, 10 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 311, 339 (2008) (stating that “a claim under
strict liability, in its purest form, occurs when the defendant’s negligence is presumed because of his
legal relationship to the [negligent person or the defective thing] that first caused the unreasonable
risk of harm”).
111. See Mossy Motors, 753 So. 2d at 276 (indicating that “the new definition by amendment
defines ultrahazardous activity legislatively, but, under the pre-amendment law, it was an easy leap
between pile-driving, explosives and dewatering).
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112

care used by the landowner would not have exonerated it from civil
113
liability.
114
the Louisiana Supreme
In Yokum v. 615 Bourbon Street, LLC,
115
Court granted certiorari for the purpose of reversing
the appellate
court’s ruling that a commercial owner and lessor is not liable under
Civil Code Article 667 for excessive noise associated with loud music
played in the owner, or lessor’s, establishment. The appellate court
determined that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently establish a cause of
action against the named lessor (defendant) in this particular case.
Plaintiffs complained that they had been subjected to loud and on-going
116
live entertainment
conducted at the bar that the defendant leased to
another commercial entity. Plaintiffs sent letters to the establishment,
hoping to resolve the issue without court intervention, but with no
success.
The appellate court found that the defendant was not legally
responsible for the excessive loud music coming from the commercial
establishment because the lessor had leased the property to a third party,
117
and it was the third party who caused the harm. More specifically, the
appellate court found that the lease agreement between the defendant and
his lessee mentioned that if the lessee used the property in any manner
that would tend to injure, depreciate, or otherwise be classified as
unlawful, the lease agreement would be considered breached and would
exonerate the lessor from liability. The Louisiana Supreme Court
discussed at length that the language of the relevant statute, La. Civil
Code Art. 667, directs the restrictions and limitations on the right of use
of immovable property that may deprive a neighbor of the liberty of
118
using or enjoying his or her property.
However, the Louisiana
Supreme
Court
needed
to
reconcile
whether
these
owners/proprietors/lessors can be held accountable for any use violations
on their property by their lessees (natural or juridical) when the

112. See Mack E. Barham, The Viability of Comparative Negligence as a Defense to Strict
Liability in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1984) (declaring that “[i]in traditional common
law jurisdictions, strict liability has generally been imposed when the activity giving rise to liability
falls into the broad categories of either ultrahazardous activity or some type of product liability”).
113. See Lombard v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. 1973)
(stating that under Article 667, the [Sewerage & Water Board] would be liable for damages to the
plaintiff’s property caused by its construction activities, no matter how prudently they were done).
114. See Yokum v. 615 Bourbon St., LLC., 2007-1785 (La. 2/26/08); 977 So. 2d 859.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 862.
117. Id. at 869.
118. Id. at 872.
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violations derive from the permission of these owners. In essence, the
Louisiana Supreme Court correctly held that Article 667 permitted an
expansion of liability on the proprietor or owner even in situations where
120
the owner only indirectly contributed
to his neighbor’s harm.
Consequently, the Louisiana Supreme Court also opined that the term
“work,” as used in the article, encompassed not only constructions made
on the property, but also harmful and injurious activities held on the
property when the landowner knew, or should have known, of the
121
resulting injury or harm.
Likewise, this Author asserts that the Louisiana Supreme Court
should implement the same logic to expand the language of Article 667
to include oil drilling activities because these activities can be
122
injurious to adjacent neighbors/landowners and because including this
third category of prohibited activities would not do an injustice to the
overall scope of Article 667. As mentioned earlier, oil drilling is a
123
hybrid
of both blasting with explosives and pile driving, which the
legislature has separately defined as potentially injurious activities and
therefore when combined should also be classified as a potentially
124
injurious activity.
The rationale for this proposition might not be
125
126
universal, as the rule of absolute liability has been contingent upon
the locality of the incident or on the population of the area where the
incident occurred. While enjoying and using one’s commercial or
residential property is both necessary and essential to our state’s
economy, it is also dangerous to assume that such a right should
inherently be considered limitless. However, oil drilling is an activity
127
that is dangerous and potentially destructive to the men and women
119. See Inabnet v. Exxon Corp., 642 So. 2d 1243, 1251 (La. 1994) (citing Lombard v.
Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 284 So. 2d 905, 912 (La. 1973); Ferdinand F. Stone, Tort
Doctrine in Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 TUL. L. REV. 701, 711 (1966)).
120. See Yokum, 977 So. 2d at 875.
121. Id.
122. See Chaney v. Travelers Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 181, 186 (La. 1971) (stating that “it is not
the manner in which the activity is carried on which is significant; it is the fact that the activity
causes damage to a neighbor which is relevant”).
123. See Craig C. Freudenrich, How Oil Drilling Works, ENERGY CAPITAL GROUP,
http://www.encapgroup.com/drilling/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (discussing how oil drilling works
and how oil is extracted from the ocean floor).
124. Frank L. Maraist & Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Burying Caesar: Civil Justice Reform and
the Changing Face of Louisiana Tort Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 339, 364 (1966) (criticizing the specific
list of qualifying activities for absolute liability, commends the legislature for using language that
would give it some flexibility to include new and unanticipated situations).
125. See Jeremiah Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting—The
Rule of the Future, 33 HARV. L. REV. 667 (1920).
126. See 3 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE § 688 a (6th ed. 1913).
127. See Viscusi & Zeckhauser, supra note 9, at 1743 (indicating that BP filed several lawsuits
against other corporations in an effort to recoup some of the money that it has had to pay to those
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who work on these oil platforms and should be treated as such by the
Louisiana legislature.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, oil drilling can harm marine life, people’s lives, and
the state’s welfare, so the activity should not be beyond legislative
redress. The proposed amendment is a simple, yet necessary, legislative
128
measure that should be a part of our state’s ongoing human rights due
129
Undeniably, BP has to do more than mitigate the
diligence process.
disastrous effects of the oil spill by offering support to Gulf Coast
businesses. In fact, BP must fully compensate each and every resident
130
who has a viable claim against it. Further, BP must extend its recovery
efforts to the State of Louisiana in order to protect and shelter
Louisiana’s wildlife and coastlines.
The ecological effects from the BP Oil Spill are still being
131
132
examined
and studied, but the mental and economic effects
from
this disaster are forever visible in the eyes of Louisiana’s citizens. It is in
the eyes of the children who lost their parents on the Deep Water
Horizon. It is in the eyes of the wives who are now widows. It is in the
eyes of distraught family members who are still coping with the reality of
a loved one committing suicide because of the unrecoverable loss of
financial security. The duty to protect our citizens from harm not only
133
lies on BP’s corporate
doorstep, but it should also be found in the
policies that are proposed, debated, and signed on the floor of our

Gulf Coast residents who have been harmed in the oil spill. BP filed a tort claim against the
manufacturer of the blowout preventer and it filed another suit against Halliburton for fraud and
misconduct).
128. See Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133, 1080 (La. 1971) (declaring that the
“trend has been toward an expansion of the classes of those who are entitled to recovery as well as
an expansion of the classes from whom recovery can be had”); see also Kennedy v. Phelps, 10 La.
Ann. 227 (La. 1855); see also City of New Orleans v. Lambert, 14 La. Ann. 247 (La. 1859); see also
Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So. 2d 627 (La. 1968).
129. See generally Sherman, supra note 60.
130. See GULF COAST SENATORS, supra note 22, (Senator Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) demanded
that BP adhere to a ‘good neighbor’ policy, meaning that it should first look to utilize Gulf Coast
residents and resources as it begins to heal these communities by using an extensive, multi-year
ecological and economic recovery operation).
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legislature. It has been argued that some legislatures are incapable of
adjusting to the changing tide of our present society because state
legislatures are faced with complicated and complex issues with
insufficient expertise. It has also been stated that the government bodies
have an inherent inability to foresee or to respond to problems that may
135
arise in the future. Such explanations should not be lodged against the
Louisiana legislature, as our state has become the nation’s spokesperson
for disasters.
Trial courts should retain a reasonable amount of discretion when
determining if an activity qualifies as ultrahazardous, but it is the
legislature that has been vested with the authority to expand Article 667
136
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137
enormous risk of harm that is either temporal or generational.
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